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To date, little empirical evidence exists to help regulators understand why some firms 
comply even when there is little financial incentive to do so and others continually 
violate environmental regulations. This paper examines data on compliance with 
environmental regulations within the manufacturing sector in Mexico. The probability 
of complying depends, among other factors, on the kind of management practices of 
the firm and the level of environmental training. Some firms in the manufacturing 
sector over-comply with regulations.  Our results show that providing environmental 
training to employees in the firm increases the probability of over-compliance. Local 
community has a positive impact on over-compliance however the magnitude of its 
impact is not as strong as is often suggested in the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
Most environmental regulatory mechanisms are based on the premise that 
firms would not undertake any environmentally beneficial projects without explicit 
pressure from the regulatory authority.
1 While this premise is true in a number of 
cases, there is growing evidence that many firms comply with environmental 
regulations even when these regulations are weak or non-existent. Despite low 
penalties, studies assessing overall compliance rates have found that 60 to 80 percent 
of firms and individuals comply with environmental regulations and many voluntarily 
exceed the standards (Arora and Cason, 1996, Harrington, 1988, Gangadharan, 2001). 
Why do firms comply with environmental regulation in the presence of low fines and 
not very frequent inspection rates? According to one explanation, (Harrington, 1988), 
the enforcement process can be modelled as a Markov decision problem- i.e., the 
firms that are caught to be in violation in one period are moved to a separate group in 
the next period in which they are subject to more frequent inspection and higher fines. 
Hence firms have an incentive to comply in order to avoid being moved into the 
frequently inspected group. A second explanation is that firms comply and sometimes 
even over-comply to guide regulatory authorities to set higher standards for the whole 
industry, thereby increasing the costs of their rivals (Salop and Scheffman, 1983).  
Yet another explanation that is gaining ground recently is that firms comply to 
gain reputation as an environmentally conscious organisation. Arora & 
Gangopadhyay, 1995 show that public recognition plays a very important role in the 
success of voluntary environmental programs. Arora and Cason, 1996 assess the 
factors that influence a firm’s decision to participate in EPA’s 33/50 program in the 
                                                 
1 This is because there is often a cost associated with undertaking environmentally sustainable 
production, which is borne by the firms alone but the benefits of this sustainable production are usually 
shared by society.     4
United States. They find that firms in industries that are closer to final consumers 
(proxied by normalized advertising expenditures) are more likely to participate in this 
voluntary programme. In developing countries, environmental regulations could be 
weak and not very rigorously enforced due to budget constraints, staffing deficiencies 
and corruption in the judicial system. Hence formal enforcement mechanisms might 
not work very well in these countries and it is therefore important to focus on other 
factors that can encourage compliance amongst firms. 
In this paper, recent survey evidence from manufacturing industries in Mexico 
is used, to study the impact of different management practices, vintage of technology, 
level of environmental training and education of workers and the influence of 
community pressure on the probability of the firm complying with environmental 
regulations. Knowledge of the motivation behind a firm’s decision to improve 
environmental performance is of utmost significance. Information on factors that 
drive firms to voluntarily improve their environmental standing has obvious 
advantages to policy makers. Particularly in countries where environmental laws are 
weak, understanding the reasons why firms improve environmental performance can 
help us in formulating policies to encourage this trend. 
Hettige, Huq, Pargal and Wheeler, 1996 find that many countries in South-east 
Asia including Indonesia, Thailand and the Phillippines suffer from poor 
environmental standards that are either weak or ineffectively enforced. A common 
perception is that a lack of enforced regulations in developing countries provides 
firms with no incentives to improve their environmental performance. If this were the 
case, then it would be expected that developing countries would become pollution 
havens for many multi-national companies. However numerous studies have found   5
that many firms still comply with regulations despite minimal enforcement and 
monitoring (Hettige et al 1996, Hartment et al). 
  Recent research has identified a number of informal regulations that may 
promote environmental compliance. Where does the incentive to comply with 
regulations come from? One source identified is the capital market (Lanoie, Laplante 
and Roy, 1998). The capital market, if properly informed can play a significant role in 
pollution reduction by providing appropriate reputational and financial incentives. 
This possibility arises because capital markets can react either negatively to 
announcement of negative environmental incidents or positively to the announcement 
of positive environmental incidents (Dasgupta, Laplante and Mamingi, 1997). Sen et 
al (1998) tested the reaction of capital markets in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and 
Philippines to good environmental news and bad environmental news and found that 
the capital markets reacted positively to good environmental news and negatively to 
bad environmental news. This implies that firms in developing countries face a cost of 
pollution despite weak formal regulations. Firms’ incentives to remain “clean” may 
also be due to pressure from communities and the incentive to uphold their 
reputations (Hettige et al., 1996, 1997).  Pargal and Wheeler, 1996 find that 
communities penalise dirty factories through informal regulations. In Indonesia the 
pollution control agency initiated a programme that rates and publicly discloses the 
environmental performance of Indonesian factories. This easy to interpret colour 
rating system has been very successful in improving environmental performance at a 
very low public cost. Following the success of this programme, Phillipines, Mexico 
and Colombia are also beginning similar programmes (Tietenberg and Wheeler, 
2001). Another incentive to comply operates via the credit market. A number of   6
studies show that banks are less likely to extend credit to firms with poor 
environmental records (Lanoie, Laplante and Roy, 1998, Laplante and Lanoie, 1994).  
The motivation for this paper is multifold. Firstly, the need to understand why 
firms voluntarily reduce emissions and improve their environmental standing despite 
ineffective regulatory standards has significant policy implications for regulatory 
authorities. Research in this area has indicated the presence of informal regulations 
that provide incentives to minimise pollution, however more research is needed as 
evidence is still scarce. In addition, the study on Mexico itself is also of importance. 
Mexico City has notoriously high pollution levels, with air pollution exceeding the 
legal safe standard 182 days during 1996 (Dasgupta et. al, 2000) and this pollution 
poses a threat to human health.  
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises the data used in the 
analysis. Section 3 describes the estimation methodology employed to examine the 
data on environmental compliance. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 
concludes with a discussion of the results.  
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In this paper we use data from a survey conducted in 1995 in Mexico, by the 
World Bank, to examine the incentives that drive pollution improvement programs 
implemented at the firm level. The survey focused on four sectors: Food, chemicals, 
non-metallic minerals and metals, that are in total estimated to generate approximately 
75 percent to 95 percent of Mexico’s total industrial pollution. This includes water 
pollution, air pollution, toxic residue and non-toxic residue. Detailed interviews were 
conducted at 236 facilities, which were chosen to represent Mexican industries in a set 
of categories that were defined by sector, size class and location. The sample is well   7
balanced with 62 plants in the food sector, 62 in the chemicals sector, 51 in the non-
metallic minerals sector and 61 in the metals sector. The plants are also evenly 
distributed along the size scale, with roughly similar number in the large class and in 
the medium and small class. Size classes are defined by employment ranges, with 
small having 16-100 employees, medium about 100-250 employees and large more 
than 250 employees. In the interview, the respondents were asked questions about 
compliance with environmental regulation and management. The survey was designed 
to obtain detailed information about the determinants of the firm’s marginal 
abatement cost curve and the expected marginal penalty schedules. Dasgupta et. al, 
2000 provide an excellent summary of all the variables used in the survey.   
As the data are self-reported, they rely on the honesty and accuracy of the 
individual firms surveyed. Hence the data may be subject to upward bias, particularly 
so for variables like compliance with environmental regulations.
2 Compliance is 
divided into 5 categories and these are summarised in Table 1. Category 1 is defined 
in this paper as over-compliance and it represents 10 percent of the firms in the data. 
The firms in this category have exceeded the environmental requirements and claim to 
have initiated a world-class environmental program in their firm. Category 2 and 3 are 
added up to obtain compliance (83 percent of the firms). Category 2 has firms that 
consistently observe Mexican environmental laws and category 3 has firms that 
usually observe the environmental laws, though they sometimes fail in specific points. 
Category 4 and 5 are combined to obtain non-compliance (7 percent of the firms).  
These categories include firms that usually fail to observe environmental laws and 
firms that rarely observe the environmental laws, respectively.  
                                                 
2 Dasgupta et.al, 2000 suggest that the degree of upward bias in the Mexican data on self-assessment of 
compliance is not large. They compare the compliance rates with those from independent auditing of a 
large sample of Indonesian firms and find that the reported levels of compliance are reasonable. The 
analysis in this paper (following Dasgupta et.al, 2000) focuses on relative performance of firms and not 
on the absolute levels of compliance.   8
The factors that affect the compliance decision of a firm are the following: the 
output produced by the firm summarised by the industrial sector that the firm is in (ie, 
the sectoral composition of the firms). The firms are in the food, chemical, non-
metallic minerals and metal sector and each is represented by a dummy, with non-
metallic minerals taken as the reference dummy. Some firms reward employees for 
their contribution towards environmental performance. This is represented by a 
variable defined as Reward in the paper. Reward is equal to 1 if the firm rewards 
employees for environmental performance. It is argued that firms that give incentives 
to employees to improve environmental performance would have a higher probability 
of compliance. Whether a firm is part of a firm with multiple plants (Multiplant = 1 if 
firm has multiple plants) is another factor that could determine environmental 
compliance. Dasgupta et al 2000 found that a firm, which is part of a multiplant 
organization was related to larger environmental management effort. It is expected 
that the multiplant status allows the firm to undertake more abatement as it can exploit 
economies of scale. Ownership status of the plant is another relevant variable in this 
discussion. If the firm is publicly owned or publicly listed (Ownership2), then it 
would be subjected to greater public scrutiny and would therefore be faster in 
adopting better environmental practises. Thus publicly owned firms are anticipated to 
have a higher probability of complying with environmental regulations.  
The environmental decisions made by the firms could also be influenced by 
the markets in which they sell their products. The survey contains information on 
whether the firms sell their products in international markets. Variables have been 
defined for sales within Mexico: Sal_Mexico, sales to Asia: Sal_Asia, sales to the 
United States and Canada: Sal_Usca, sales to Europe: Sal_eur and sales to other Latin 
American countries: Sal_laam. Sales in each of these markets are coded as 0 for a 0   9
percentage of the firm’s products being sold in that market and 5 for a percentage 
between 76-100. We would expect to find that firms that have a large percentage of 
sales to more developed countries like United States, Canada and Europe would have 
a higher probability of complying with environmental regulations. This is due to the 
fact that consumers in developed countries usually have a higher preference for 
environmental quality and are often more aware of environmental issues. Hence they 
would have a lower probability of buying products from firms that have a reputation 
of polluting the environment. This could be linked to the argument that the 
environment is a luxury good and only when individuals or countries have achieved a 
certain level of income they turn their attention to environmental issues (Grossman 
and Krueger, 1995 present evidence that some pollutants follow an inverted U-shaped 
curve with respect to income, rising at lower levels of income and falling at higher 
levels).
3 In some cases, there are trade agreements that could prevent or make it very 
difficult for polluting firms to sell their products internationally. For example, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement between North America and Mexico has 
incorporated rules whereby abiding by environmental laws is necessary for firms to 
avoid sanctions.
4 This would put pressure on firms to improve compliance and 
encourage them to incorporate pollution prevention into planning and operation 
decisions within the firm.  
To be able to capture the impact of the product market in a more direct 
manner, we also define a variable for sales to final consumers (Sal_Cons). This 
                                                 
3 In the early stages of economic development, a country would be unwilling to trade consumption for 
investment in environmental regulation, hence environmental quality declines. Once the country 
reaches a threshold level of income, its citizens start to demand improvements in environmental quality 
and this leads to implementation of policies for environmental protection and eventually to reductions 
in pollution.  
4 In the early nineties, the North American Free Trade Agreement brought to public attention the 
question of the impact of trade on environmental protection in countries with different levels of 
economic development. Critics feared that this trade agreement between North America and Mexico 
could lead to significant deterioration of the environment, Husted and Logsdon, 1997.    10
variable is coded from 0 to 5 (0 for 0 percent and 5 for 76-100 percent) depending on 
the percentage of sales by the firm to final consumers. Variables for sales to industrial 
consumers (Sal_Ind) and wholesalers or distributors (Sal_Wh) have also been defined 
with the purpose of comparing with the variable Sal_Cons. These variables reflect the 
product orientation of the firm. Firms that manufacture mainly for consumers rather 
than for industrial or wholesale consumption, are in more direct contact with the 
public. Labatt, 1997 shows that product orientation of the firm has an important role 
to play in reducing packaging waste, with consumer oriented firms observed to be 
more proactive in reducing the amount of waste. It is therefore expected that higher 
the percentage of sales to final consumers, better is the environmental performance of 
the firm. 
Other variables that can influence the compliance decision of the firm are 
whether the necessary technology required to undertake environmental improvements 
is available (Tech_avail = 1 if the relevant technology is available) and assessment of 
the environmental impact of the firm (Cont_eval = 1 if the firm has a procedure for 
continuous evaluation). The human capital employed by the firm have a very 
important role to play as well. The education level of employees (represented by the 
percentage of employees with more than primary education: Empsec) could have an 
impact on environmental performance of the firm. Training of employees performing 
tasks in the environmental section of the firm and in the other sections can be vital to 
the success of a lot of environmental programs. Training could be in areas of 
environmental management, environmental auditing, environmental law, risk 
analysis, handling of hazardous residue, industrial risk minimisation or even a 
Masters in environmental engineering. Some firms are active in providing training 
within the firm or providing access to training (The variables defined to examine the   11
effect of training are the following: Train_ne: environmental training available to 
employees not directly involved in the area of environment, Train_e: Environmental 
staff received training since 1990, Envman: Have the staff in the environmental area 
been trained in the field of environmental management) and it is expected that these 
firms would have a higher probability of being compliant. There are some additional 
variables in the survey that address the question of management differences between 
different firms and the number of staff available to work in the environmental section. 
Variable Env_resp = 1 indicates that in some firms, persons not assigned to the 
environmental sections have environmental responsibility and variable Oth_resp =1   
indicates that employees have other responsibilities in addition to the environmental 
ones. Env_pers = 1 represents the firms who have hired more employees in the 
environmental area.       
Firms with newer technology could incur lower abatement costs as new 
machines might be more energy efficient and might incorporate measures to decrease 
polluting by-products. Variables Tech 80 (Code for Percentage of plant installed prior 
to 1980) and Tech 90 (Percentage of plant installed since 1990) have been included in 
the model to capture this effect. Compliance by firms is often affected by the 
inspection rates by the environmental agency. This is represented by the variable: 
Inspect = 1, if the firm has been inspected by the authorities with regard to their 
environmental performance. Magat and Viscusi, 1990 and Laplante and Rilstone, 
1996 show that inspections and the threat of inspections significantly reduce the 
absolute levels of water pollution emitted by the pulp and paper plants in the United 
States and Canada. Dasgupta et al, 1999 show that inspections significantly reduce 
industrial air and water pollution in China. Information barriers about environmental 
issues (for example, what the law requires and what kind of technology is available to   12
improve environmental performance) are another reason why firms might not comply. 
This is included in the variable: Envinfo, which is = 1 if firms find it difficult to 
obtain environmental information.  
Local communities and neighbourhood groups are often argued to influence a 
firm’s environmental record.  Firms are concerned about public opinion as bad 
publicity could have an adverse effect on their product market and share market 
performance. Communities that are richer, better educated and have more access to 
information about the consequences of environmental pollution find innovative ways 
of enforcing environmental norms. These communities would also be able to use 
available regulatory channels more efficiently. The survey asks questions on the 
extent of influence of neighbourhood and local communities in the firm’s decision 
making on environmental issues. Information on the influence of industrial chamber 
and associations and the influence of legislative requirements is also obtained. All the 
data however is for one time period and some of these variables would start having an 
impact on the firm’s compliance outcome after a lag. For example, we might observe 
that a firm with a bad environmental performance has stated that the neighbourhood 
and local community have been very influential in determining their actions regarding 
environmental issues. So in the data we might in some cases find a negative 
relationship between the community variable and the firm’s compliance record, which 
might seem counter-intuitive. These variables (the community, business and legal 
variables) therefore could be endogenous. However to correct for their potential 
endogeniety bias we need good instruments (for example, variables lagged by a time 
period), which are difficult to find as all the data are cross-sectional.    
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3. Estimation Methodology 
The decision to comply with environmental regulations is described by the 
following latent variable model. 
  iii CX β ε
∗ = +   
i C
∗ is the net benefit attained by firm i by over-complying with environmental 
regulations. Xi is a vector of firm characteristics that determine  i C
∗, and εi is a random 
error, with zero mean and unit variance. However,  i C
∗ is not observed – what we do 
observe is the following variable: 







This can be estimated using a binary logit model.  
Now let us assume that  i C  can take more values (over-comply, comply and not 
comply with environmental regulations):   
0, if the firm over-complies  
1, if the firm complies







In the multinomial logit estimation procedure we can rewrite the above as follows: 
(i)  1 0:   (firm over-complies), ii CC µ
∗ =>  
(ii)  12 1: , (firm complies), ii CC µµ
∗ =≥ ≥  
(iii)  2 2: , (firm does not comply) ii CC µ
∗ = ;  
In the above equations, µ1 and µ2 are unknown parameters. The estimated equation is 
given by: 
ii i CX β ε = +          14
The reduced form parameters of this equation are estimated using maximum 
likelihood based on a multinomial logistic distribution of ε. Since the probabilities of 
being in the 3 states (i) – (iii) must add to unity for each firm, the multinomial logit 
strategy involves estimating two equations. In this study, we have normalised 
category (i), i.e. adopted the state of over-compliance as the baseline case in the 
multinomial logit regressions.  The choices mentioned above can also be ranked in a 
descending order from the viewpoint of social welfare. The welfare based ordering 
would be as follows: if firm over-complies (Ci = 0), if it complies (Ci = 1), if it does 
not comply (Ci =2). The equation is then re-estimated as an ordered logit model that 
respects this welfare ordering.  
In addition to the compliance with environmental laws, we also examine if 
firms have implemented any improvement programs (with respect to their 
environmental performance) since 1990 or have plans to undertake improvements. 
Improve is defined to be binary variable, with 0 representing the choice to not 
improve and 1 representing the choice to make improvements. This is estimated using 
a binary logit model. This variable captures the firm’s commitment to have better 
environmental performance in the future.  
Heteroscedasticity across observations can often be a concern with cross 
section analyses, hence the estimates reported in the paper are White-
heteroscedasticity consistent. There is some correlation between different groups of 
variables in the data set, however multicollinearity does not appear to have been a 
problem for estimation.   15
 
4. Results 
Of particular interest in the compliance literature is the issue of over-
compliance. Why do some firms comply more than required by law? To focus on the 
over-compliance decision of the firm, we examine the factors that determine whether 
firms comply more than required by legislation. Out of 235 firms in the data set, 23 
firms over-comply with environmental regulations. Table 2 presents the logit 
estimates of the factors that determine the firm’s decision to over-comply with 
environmental regulations. Firms in the food and the chemical industry have a lower 
probability of over-complying as compared to the non-metallic minerals. Firms that 
give a reward to their employees, financially or otherwise, for their contribution to the 
environmental performance of the firm exhibit a significantly higher probability of 
over-compliance. Similarly firms with multiple plants have a higher probability of 
over-compliance. This is expected as firms that have a multiplant status have the 
ability to undertake more abatement by perhaps buying cleaner machines and also by 
initiating a progressive environmental management strategy in their firm.  
An increase in the firm’s domestic sales reduces the probability of over-
compliance. An increase in sales to the United Sates and Europe also decrease the 
probability of over-compliance. An increase in sales to Latin America increases the 
probability of over-compliance. An increase in sales to final consumers and to 
industries decreases the probability of over-complying. When the percentage of 
employees with more than primary education is higher in firms, then the probability 
of over-compliance increases. When the staff not directly involved in the area of the 
environment are given environmental training, then the probability of over-
compliance increases. Similarly, when staff not assigned to environmental sections   16
are given environmental responsibilities then again the probability of over-compliance 
is high.  These management policies increase awareness of environmental issues in 
the whole firm and also motivate people to do better than what the law requires. The 
vintage of the technology used by the firms matters: when the percentage of plant 
installed prior to 1980 is higher then probability of over-compliance is lower. 
Installation of newer technology seems to increase the probability of over-
compliance. This could also be an indicator of indivisibilities in the abatement 
technology. Newer technology could be so efficient that it leads to more pollution 
reduction than required or planned by the firm. Inspection by environmental 
authorities reduces the probability of over-compliance. It is possible that inspection is 
targeted towards firms that have a record of non-compliance, hence inspection could 
be an endogenous variable. Pargal et.al, 1997 estimate a simultaneous equation model 
taking into account the endogeniety of the inspections variable and use data on 
industrial water pollution from India to find that the frequency of inspections have no 
impact on the level of emissions of firms. Local community has a positive influence 
on environmental over-compliance, whereas industrial associations and business have 
a negative impact on over-compliance. Providing training in environmental 
management to staff who work in the environment section, seems to reduce the 
probability of over-compliance.        
 
4.1. Multinomial Compliance Choice    
Table 3 presents the multinomial logit regression estimates for a) the case 
where the firm complies and b) where the firm does not comply. The choice category 
of over-compliance has been adopted as the baseline category for normalisation. The 
corresponding marginal probabilities are presented in Table 4.   17
The results from the multinomial estimation procedure indicate that the firms 
in the food and chemical industry have a higher probability of compliance and firms 
in the metal industry have a lower probability of compliance. The policy of giving a 
reward for environmental performance seems to increase the probability of non-
compliance compared to the over-compliance baseline. Similarly if the firm has a 
multi-plant status it has a higher probability of being non-compliant as compared to 
the baseline category. A higher percentage of sales to Asia and to other Latin 
American countries leads to a higher probability of not complying with environmental 
regulations. It is possible that consumers in Asia and Latin America are less 
environmentally conscious than the consumers in the United States, Canada and 
Europe hence firms that sell their products in the Asian and Latin American markets 
are less concerned about their environmental performance. An increase in the sales to 
final consumers decreases the probability of not complying and increases in sales to 
industrial consumers also decreases the probability of non-compliance. This makes 
intuitive sense as firms that sell directly to final consumers are more responsive to 
environmental concerns (as compared to firms that sell to wholesalers or distributors) 
and are interested in projecting a green image as this might help increase their market 
share. Availability of appropriate technology seems to lead to a higher probability of 
non-compliance and so does the continuous assessment of the environmental impact 
of the plant.  
A higher percentage of employees in a firm with more than primary education 
leads to a higher probability of that firm not complying. Dasgupta et al (2000) 
confirm that employee education does not significantly raise compliance.  When 
environmental training is available to employees not directly involved in the area of 
environmental management, then it leads to a higher probability of the firm not   18
complying, relative to the baseline category of over-compliance. Employees in non-
environmental sections of the firm might not be concerned about or aware about the 
environmental implications of their actions. Hence the management could be targeting 
training towards these groups and this could start having an impact on environmental 
performance, however this could be observed only with a time lag. To be able to 
examine this issue, we need to follow the firm’s environmental performance over a 
number of years and use panel data estimation techniques.  Inspection by 
environmental authorities increases the probability of over compliance. The vintage of 
the technology in the firm seems to have a perverse effect, as when percentage of 
plant installed before 1980 increases, there is a decrease in the non-compliance 
probability of a firm. So having old technology in the plant leads to higher 
compliance levels. Industrial chambers and associations are influential in significantly 
increasing the probability of over compliance amongst firms. Neighbourhood and 
local communities seem to have no impact on compliance probabilities of firms. 
Finally, the compliance choices that a firm faces can also be ranked with respect to 
social welfare. To estimate this ordered choice model we use an ordered logit model. 
The estimates from this model are very similar to the multinomial logit results. They 
are not presented in the paper but are available on request. 
      
4.2. Improvements in Environmental Performance  
Another variable of interest is whether the firm has any plans to improve 
environmental performance or has carried out improvement programs since 1990. 
Examining this variable helps us in understanding the firm’s interest in making 
dynamic changes to its management strategy and whether it has a sustained interest in 
environmental practises. Decision to improve is a binary variable: with 0, representing   19
the choice to not improve and 1 representing the choice to make improvements. 
Results from this binary logit model are presented in Table 5. The results show that 
technology being available and continuous assessment of the performance of the plant 
leads to a higher probability of improvements being carried out by the firm. The 
marginal results indicate that these factors can increase the probability of 
improvements by 5 percent. Providing environmental training and responsibility to all 
employees, even those who do not work in the environmental management area 
increases the probability of improvements being carried out by the firm by about 11 
percent. Rewarding employees for environmental performance strangely, decreases 
the probability of improvements being carried out by the firm. A possible reason for 
obtaining this counter-intuitive result is that the firms that have instituted this reward 
policy might be the ones who have bad environmental records and are now trying to 
motivate their employees to take environmental implications into consideration. 
Hence this negative relationship in the data between reward and environmental 
improvements could be due to endogeniety issues, which could be corrected for if we 
had access to long term data or had other relevant variables that could be used as 
instruments.  The community and business variables do not play a significant role in 
influencing the probability of improvements. 
 
5. Discussion 
Firms’ decision regarding compliance can be explained in various ways. Some 
firms comply due to the fear of inspections and fines, others comply as they want to 
project an environmentally responsible image to their consumers and shareholders.  
This paper examines data on compliance by Mexican manufacturing sector firms. 
Over-compliance by firms in this sample, is observed to be influenced by positive   20
factors (for example, rewards and training) more than negative factors (like 
inspections). Rewarding environmental performance increases the probability of over-
compliance. These rewards are given to employees based on environmental 
performance measures, on suggestions for environmental improvements or for 
observance of internal auditing. They can take financial forms or they could also be in 
the form of recognition within the firm. Providing environmental training similarly 
leads to an increase in the firm’s probability of over-compliance with environmental 
regulations.   Community variables are influential in increasing the likelihood of over-
compliance. These variables are statistically significant in increasing the probability 
of over-compliance, though their magnitudes are not very big. The data that we 
examine in this paper deals with air pollution, water pollution, toxic and non-toxic 
residue and some of this pollution is perhaps not easy to identify. Communities 
usually pay particular attention to firms whose pollution activities are more visible. 
Researchers who have found that community pressure can have an enormous impact 
on the firm’s incentive to reduce emissions have often focused on one kind of 
pollution being emitted by firms (for example: Pargal and Wheeler, 1996 examine the 
extent of water pollution generated by industries). As the data are aggregated for 
different kinds of pollution indicators in this paper, it is difficult to capture the impact 
of collective action by communities. We therefore find that the community variables 
though significant, do not have big coefficients.     
  As the data are cross-sectional, it is difficult to examine the dynamic nature of 
environmental performance of firms.  A few of the variables used in the paper are 
endogenous and this could lead to some bias in the estimated coefficients. To be able 
to determine the exact causal relationship between compliance and some of these   21
potentially endogenous variables, we need access to panel data, which is not available 
at this point of time.     
Notwithstanding the limitations of the data, the results show that some factors 
are very robust in explaining the compliance decisions of firms. The environmental 
training provided to employees working in the firm is observed to be very important 
in improving environmental performance. The implication of this is that 
environmental policy makers should put more emphasis on providing and in some 
cases subsidising environmental training to employees in developing countries. 
Training would increase the stock of human capital by improving information flows 
and increasing morale. It would also have the ability to create positive externalities 
and spillovers and would therefore be expected to lead to better economic and 
environmental outcomes for the firm and for society. These kind of informal and 
voluntary schemes can be initiated with modest public funds and are a valuable 
addition to the policy toolkit  of  regulators.       22
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Tables:  
Table 1: Compliance (Self-Assessed Measure) 
Environmental Performance  Number of Plants  % of Total 
Excellent: far more than necessary for 
compliance 
23 10 
Good: almost always in compliance  96  41 
Fair: occassionally compliant  99  42 
Poor: never in compliance  10  4 
Very poor: far below compliance; very 
damaging 
8 3 
   25
 
Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Binary Logit Model 
Dependent Variable: Over-compliance (=1 if firm over-complies and 0 otherwise) 
Variable Coefficient  Std  Error  Marginal 
Constant 0.15  3.77  0.99E-05 
Food -3.26**  1.54  -0.21E-03 
Metal   0.45  1.15  0.29E-04 
Chemical -2.10*  1.25  -0.14E-03 
Reward 2.90**  0.97  0.19E-03 
Multiplant 5.41**  1.10  0.35E-03 
Ownership1 -0.18  1.31  -0.12E-04 
Ownership2 0.46  1.23  0.30E-04 
Sal_Mexico -0.80**  0.33  -0.51E-04 
Sal_Asia 2.08**  0.79  0.13E-03 
Sal_Usca -1.60**  0.53  -0.10E-03 
Sal_Eur -1.66**  0.57  -0.11E-03 
Sal_Laam 0.57*  0.36  0.37E-04 
Sal_Cons -2.30**  0.63  -0.15E-03 
Sal_Wh -0.15  0.30  -0.98E-05 
Sal_Ind -0.88**  0.36  -0.57E-04 
Tech_avail 1.44  1.57  0.92E-04 
Cont_eval 1.63  1.09  0.10E-03 
Empsec 0.04**  0.02  0.28E-05 
Train_ne 2.46**  0.97  0.16E-03 
Train_e 0.15  0.86  0.97E-05 
Env_resp 3.51**  0.89  0.23E-03 
Oth_resp -0.10  1.47  -0.64E-04 
Env_pers 0.66  0.94  0.43E-04 
Tech80 -1.44**  0.43  -0.93E-04 
Tech90 0.14  0.28  0.88E-05 
Inspect -4.94**  1.67  -0.32E-03 
Envinfo -1.18  0.96  -0.76E-04 
Community 3.38**  1.30  0.22E-03 
Business -4.22**  1.06  -0.27E-03 
Legal -0.30  1.06  -0.19E-04 








Degrees of freedom  31 
Notes: 
Robust Standard Errors: Corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
Significance: *: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 5-percent. 
**: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 1-percent.   26
Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Multinomial Logit Model 
Dependent Variable: Compliance (can take values: 0:over-comply, 1: comply and 2: not 
comply) 
 Prob(Y=1)  Prob(Y=2) 




Constant  -1.94 2.01 -5.33 3.34 
Food  -0.60  0.71 -2.60* 1.40 
Metal    -2.55**  1.11 -2.06 1.49 
Chemical  -1.07  0.73 -2.21* 1.14 
Reward  2.52  1.53 4.70** 1.76 
Multiplant  -1.04  0.78 3.32** 1.31 
Sal_Mexico  0.10 0.21 -0.21 0.38 
Sal_Asia  1.20  1.03 2.39* 1.33 
Sal_Usca  0.47 0.63 -0.78 0.76 
Sal_Laam  1.92** 0.77 2.17** 0.82 
Sal_Cons -0.12  0.20  -1.74**  0.47 
Sal_Wh  -0.34 0.24 -0.44 0.33 
Sal_Ind -0.33  0.24  -0.87**  0.35 
Tech_avail 1.25*  0.75  1.99  1.41 
Cont_eval  2.96** 0.82 4.73** 1.34 
Empsec  0.001 0.01 0.04* 0.03 
Train_ne  0.94  1.27 2.51* 1.48 
Train_e  0.67 0.79 1.51 1.03 
Env_resp -1.00  0.80  1.78  1.33 
Oth_resp 2.29*  1.21  1.75  1.67 
Env_pers  0.22 0.76 0.51 1.09 
Tech80 -0.15  0.21  -1.26**  0.39 
Tech90  -0.12 0.21 -0.08 0.32 
Inspect  1.16 0.78 -2.22 1.40 
Envinfo  0.25 0.68 -0.74 1.08 
Community -0.13  0.66  1.78  1.15 
Business  0.79  0.63 -2.11* 1.18 
Legal  1.07 0.76 0.85 1.30 








Degrees of freedom  56 
Notes: 
Robust Standard Errors: Corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
Significance: *: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 5-percent. 
**: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 1-percent.   27
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Multinomial Logit Model: Marginal 
Effects 
Dependent Variable: Compliance (can take values: 0:over-comply, 1: comply and 2: not 
comply) 
Variable  Prob(Y=0) Prob(Y=1) Prob(Y=2) 
Constant -0.10E-05  -0.32E-04  0.33E-04 
Food 0.40E-07  0.24E-03  -0.24E-03 
Metal   0.15E-06  -0.36E-04  0.36E-04 
Chemical 0.31E-07  0.15E-03  -0.15E-03 
Reward -0.11E-06  -0.21E-03  0.21E-03 
Multiplant 0.40E-07  -0.40E-03  0.40E-03 
Ownership1 0.13E-05  0.97E-05  -0.11E-04 
Ownership2 0.14E-05  -0.37E-04  0.36E-04 
Sal_Mexico -0.28E-07  0.58E-04  -0.58E-04 
Sal_Asia -0.16E-08  -0.16E-03  0.16E-03 
Sal_Usca -0.20E-07  0.12E-03  -0.11E-03 
Sal_Eur -0.11E-05  0.12E-03  -0.12E-03 
Sal_Laam -0.13E-06  -0.40E-04  0.40E-04 
Sal_Cons 0.21E-08  0.17E-03  -0.17E-03 
Sal_Wh 0.17E-07  0.11E-04  -0.11E-04 
Sal_Ind 0.11E-07  0.64E-04  -0.64E-04 
Tech_avail -0.66E-07  -0.97E-04  0.97E-04 
Cont_eval -0.18E-06  -0.12E-03  0.12E-03 
Empsec 0.43E-09  -0.33E-05  0.33E-05 
Train_ne -0.63E-07  -0.18E-03  0.18E-03 
Train_e -0.37E-07  -0.81E-05  0.82E-05 
Env_resp 0.35E-07  -0.25E-03  0.25E-03 
Oth_resp -0.17E-06  0.80E-04  -0.80E-04 
Env_pers -0.28E-07  -0.48E-04  0.48E-04 
Tech80 0.28E-08  0.11E-03  -0.11E-03 
Tech90 -0.18E-08  -0.10E-04  0.10E-04 
Inspect -0.53E-07  0.37E-03  -0.37E-03 
Envinfo -0.14E-07  0.88E-04  -0.88E-04 
Community 0.57E-08  -0.25E-03  0.25E-03 
Business -0.17E-07  0.31E-03  -0.31E-03 
Legal -0.62E-07  0.25E-04  -0.25E-04 
Envman -0.57E-07  0.19E-03  -0.19E-03 
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Table 5 :Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Logit Model 
Dependent Variable: Improve 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  Marginal 
Effects 
Constant -4.73**  2.18  -0.15 
Food  0.55 0.77 0.02 
Metal   -1.24  1.13  -0.04 
Chemical 0.10  0.62  0.003 
Reward -1.87**  0.69  -0.06 
Multiplant -0.12  0.52  -0.004 
Ownership1  0.56 0.83 0.02 
Ownership2 -0.08  0.91  -0.003 
Sal_Mexico 0.24  0.22  0.008 
Sal_Asia  2.44 1.60 0.08 
Sal_Usca  0.36 0.32 0.01 
Sal_Eur -0.04  0.38  -0.001 
Sal_Laam 0.48*  0.29  0.02 
Sal_Cons -0.25  0.24  -0.008 
Sal_Wh -0.01  0.21  -0.003 
Sal_Ind -0.06  0.25  -0.002 
Tech_avail 1.60**  0.59  0.05 
Cont_eval 1.56**  0.63  0.05 
Empsec -0.02*  0.01  -0.0006 
Train_ne 3.29**  1.16  0.11 
Train_e  0.66 0.68 0.02 
Env_resp 1.41**  0.69  0.05 
Oth_resp 1.55**  0.66  0.05 
Env_pers  0.74 0.66 0.02 
Tech80 0.18  0.16  0.006 
Tech90 0.28  0.20  0.009 
Inspect  0.30 0.81 0.01 
Envinfo -0.12  0.60  -0.004 
Community  0.67 0.56 0.02 
Business -0.70  0.56  -0.02 
Legal  0.82 0.78 0.03 
Envman  0.32 1.14 0.01 
Number of Observations  235 
Log Likelihood function  -57.98 
Chi-squared 107.71 
Degrees of freedom  31 
Notes: 
Robust Standard Errors: Corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
Significance: *: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 5-percent. 
**: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 1-percent.   30
 
 